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Makes: The Legal Practice of Corporate Takeover and Mandatory Tender Off

The Legal Practice of Corporate Takeover and Mandatory
Tender Offer (MTO) in the Indonesian Capital Market1
Yozua Makes*

Makes & Partners
The number of takeover transactions is relatively less compared to other corporate actions by
publicly-listed companies, (e.g. IPOs, rights issues, or material transactions). There is no research
that explains or contextualizes this fact, but one may speculate that this may be due to (a) the existence of block-holders in Indonesia’s corporate structure profile (structural barrier) or (b) because it
is costly to carry out a takeover in light of the existing Mandatory Tender Offer (MTO) requirements
(legal barrier). This article focuses on the latter problem, aiming to address the practical and legal
issues pertaining to takeover transactions in Indonesia with respect to the existence of the MTO.
Pursuant to the prevailing rule, in a takeover of publicly-listed companies that results in a change of
control, a MTO/mandatory bid requirement must be followed with the potential acquirer making an
offer to purchase all of the remaining shares of the target company according to a certain minimum
price formula. Specifically the article discusses practical and creative strategies that prospective
controllers employ to avoid the mandatory bid/MTO requirement, and how these strategies impact
the principle of minority shareholders’ protection..
Keywords: takeover, Mandatory tender offer, Indonesia Capital Market.

Introduction
There is increasing attention given to the
importance of takeover actions whether by
way of asset and/or share acquisitions in support of Indonesia’s unprecedented economic
growth. In theory, business expansion by way
of acquisition (especially through share acquisitions), or takeover, with the acquirer bringing new resources to increase the value of the
target company, should accelerate the pace of
the acquiring company’s growth compared to

if such expansion is conducted through organic
growth. From a general capital market perspective, an active takeover market reflects a vibrant
economy and an aggressive approach that characterize publicly-listed companies in Indonesia
today. Indeed, takeover by, and/or of, companies listed in the stock exchange is a clear sign
of a dynamic and bustling Indonesian capital
market.
Notwithstanding the above, the number of
takeover transactions is relatively less compared to other corporate actions by publicly-

The majority part of this article is modified from the author’s draft doctoral dissertation under the auspices of the Faculty
of Law of the University of Indonesia, and Maastricht University.
* Senior partner and founder of Makes & Partners, a boutique law firm specializing in commercial law and corporate
finance. S.H. (University of Indonesia ), LL.M. (University of California-Berkeley), M.M, (Asian Institute of Management), AMP (Harvard University) and Ph.D. candidate in a joint program between the Faculty of Law, University of
Indonesia, and Maastricht University. The author would like to thank M. Ajisatria Suleiman and Christine Herrera for
peer-reviewing this article. Makes & Partners is 2014 Indonesia National Law Firm of the Year (IFLR) and 2014 Indonesia Best Corporate and Finance Law Firm (IAIR).
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listed companies, (e.g. IPOs, right issues, or
material transactions). Records show that in
2007, there were 16 takeover and mandatory
tender offer (MTO) transactions that occurred
in IDX, but there were no Voluntary Tender Offers (VTO).2 In 2008, there were nine takeover
MTO deals and no VTO.3 In 2009, there were
nine takeovers and MTOs for eight issuers/publicly-listed companies, as well as one VTO.4 In
2010, the market saw 10 takeovers and MTO
transactions and no VTO.5 In 2011, there were
11 takeover and MTO transactions, as well as
three VTO transactions.6
In comparison, in 2007, there were 24 IPOs,
100% more than the previous 12 of 2006, and an
increasing value of 470.82% from 3.01 trillion
2

in 2006 to 17.18 trillion in 2007. Further, there
were 25 rights issues or limited IPOs in 2007,
while the previous year saw only 16 rights issue deals. The most common deal in 2007 was
the issuance of corporate bonds, where the
stock exchange listed 39 deals or an increase
of 178.57% in number and 173.14% in value
from the previous year. In 2008, there were 170
IPOs, 25 rights issues, and 20 bond issuances.
In 2009, the number and value of IPO, rights
issues, and corporate bond issuances were still
higher than takeover deals, i.e., respectively:
13 IPO deals, 15 rights issue deals, and 28 corporate bond issuances. In 2010, there were 24
IPOs, 31 rights issues, and 29 corporate bond
issuances. Meanwhile, in 2011, there were 25

See BAPEPAM-LK, Annual Report 2007, which highlighted the following transactions:
Target Company

Offeror

PT. Bank Arta Niaga Kencana Tbk

PT Bank Commonwealth Indonesia

PT AHAP Insurance Tbk

PT Asuransi Central Asia

PT Trimegah Securities

Demerara Limited

PT Bank Swadesi Tbk

Bank of India

PT Indoexchange Tbk

Integrax Berhard.

PT Mulialand Tbk

PT Muliamustika Tataindah

PT Integrasi Teknologi Tbk

Goodwill Investment Services Inc.

PT Courts Indonesia Tbk

Malaysia Retail Group Limited

PT Dyviacom Intrabumi Tbk

PT Philadel Terra Lestari

PT Anta Express Tour & Travel Service Tbk

PT Trans Lifestyle

PT Sari Husada Tbk

Nutricia International BV

PT Branta Mulia Tbk

Kordsa Global Endustriyel Iplik ve Kord

PT Summitplast Tbk

Sumitomo Shoji Chemical Co, Ltd

PT Panasia Filament Inti Tbk

PT Panasia Indosyntex Tbk

PT Toba Pulp Lestari Tbk

Pinnacle Company Ltd

PT PP London Sumatera Indonesia Tbk

PT Salim Ivomas Pratama

Bezi Sanayi ve Ticaret AS

See BAPEPAM-LK Annual Report 2008 (2009) (Indon.). The deals are as follows: The takeover of PT Bank Nusantara
Parahyangan Tbk by ACOM Co; PT Alfa Retailindo Tbk by PT Carrefour Indonesia; PT Bank UOB Tbk by UOB International Private Ltd; PT Apexindo Prama Duta Tbk by Mira International Holdings Pte Ltd; PT BII Tbk by Maybank
Offshore Service; PT Cipendawa Industri Tbk by Indo Setubara Ltd; PT Tri Polyta Indonesia Tbk by Barito Pacific Tbk;
PT Tempo Scan Pacific Tbk by Bogamulia Nagadi; and PT Ades Water Tbk by SOFOS Pte Ltd.
4
See BAPEPAM-LK Annual Report 2009 (2010) (Indon.). The deals are: the takeover of PT Bentoel Internasional Investama Tbk by British American Tobacco; PT Multi Agro Persada Tbk by Malvolia Pte Ltd; PT Itamaraya Tbk by Trust
Energy Resources Pte Ltd; PT Bristol-Myers Squibb Indonesia Tbk by Taisho Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd; PT Indosat Tbk
by Qatar Telecom; PT. Enseval Megatrading by PT Kalbe Farma Tbk; PT Bank Ekonomi Raharja Tbk by HSBC Asia
Pacific Holdings (UK) Limited; and PT Petrosea Tbk by PT Indika Energy Tbk. The one VTO was for the shares of PT
Citra Tubindo Tbk by Kestrel Wave Investment Limited.
5
See Bapepam-LK Annual Report 2010 (2011) (Indon.). The deals are: the takeover of PT Eatertainment International
Tbk by PT Mutiara Timur Pratama, PT Matahari Department Store Tbk by PT Meadows Indonesia PT Sugih Energi Tbk
by PT Ramba Energy Indonesia Limited PT Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk by Asia Pacific Breweries Ltd, PT Kageo Igar
Jaya Tbk by PT Kingsford Holdings, PT Tifico Fiber Indonesia Tbk by a consortium of PT Prospect Motor, PT Hermawan
Sentral Investama, PT Wiratama Karya Sejati, and Pioneer Atrium Holdings; PT Allbond Makmur Usaha Tbk by Renuka
Resource Holdings, PT Aqua Golden Mississippi Tbk by PT Tirta Investama, PT Aneka Kemasindo Utama Tbk by Oil
and gas Ventures Limited, and PT Titan Kimia Nusantara Tbk by Titan International Corp. Sdn Bhd.
6
See Bapepam-LK Annual Report 2011 (2012) (Indon.). The deals include, among others: the takeover of PT Sara Lee
Body Care Indonesia Tbk by Unilever Indonesia Holding BV, PT. Sorini Agro Asia Corporindo Tbk by PT Cargill Foods
Indonesia, PT Berau Coal Energi Tbk by Vallar Investments UK Limited, PT Dynaplast Tbk by Hambali Dana Mitra (no
mandatory tender offer), PT. Keramika Indonesia Asosiasi Tbk by SCG Building Materials Company Limited, and PT
Eratex Tbk by PT Buana Indah Garments.
3
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IPOs, 25 rights issues, and 40 corporate bond
issuances.7
However, the same data also show that the
number of takeover deals is relatively high compared to merger transactions, where the market
saw only two mergers in 2007, two mergers
in 2008, four mergers in 2009, two mergers in
2010, and four mergers in 2011.8 Nevertheless,
takeover deals are still less active than IPOs and
rights issues.
From the above, it is evident that takeover transactions, while practiced more than
mergers, still take a backseat to other corporate actions in Indonesia today. While still not
prevalently employed, it is undeniable that the
impact of takeover transactions on the development of regulations and on the Indonesian capital market in general, is significant and worthy
of discussion. There is no (financial) research
that explains or contextualizes this fact, but one
may speculate that this may be due to (a) the
existence of block-holders in Indonesia’s corporate structure profile (structural barrier) or
(b) because it is costly to carry out a takeover in
light of the existing MTO requirements (legal
barrier).
This article aims to address the practical and
legal issues pertaining to takeover transactions
in Indonesia. Pursuant to the prevailing rule,
in a takeover of publicly-listed companies that
results in a change of control, a MTO/mandatory bid requirement must be followed in which
the potential acquirer must offer to purchase all

of the remaining shares of the target company
according to a certain minimum price formula.
As such, there is a need for an academic discussion on the practical and creative strategies
that prospective controllers employ to avoid
the mandatory bid/MTO requirement, and how
these strategies impact the principle of minority
shareholders’ protection.
Regulatory overview
Takeover
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1, issued by
then Bapepam LK, governs takeovers of publicly-listed companies in Indonesia. As of 31
December 2012, the functions, duties and regulatory and supervisory authorities of the Bapepam-LK (the former Indonesian Capital Market
supervisory authority) have been transferred to
the Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK), the Indonesian Financial Services Authority by virtue of
Law No. 21/2011. Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1
was enacted in 2000, amended in 2002, 2008,
and the current law is the 2011 amendment.9
Regulation IX.H.1 is related to the tender offer
rule, known as a voluntary public bid, which is
governed by the 2011 amended version of Bapepam Regulation IX.F.1.10 The 2011 amendments of Regulation IX.H.1 and IX.F.111 make
clear distinctions between the rules on takeovers
and mandatory bids (Bapepam Rule IX.H.1
2011) and the rule on voluntary bids (Bapepam

See Bapepam-LK Annual Report of 2007 (2008), Bapepam-LK Annual Report 2008 (2009), Bapepam-LK Annual Report 2009 (2010), Bapepam-LK Annual Report 2010 (2011), and Bapepam-LK Annual Report 2011 (2012).
8
See Id., Bapepam-LK Annual Report of 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011.
9
Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 was first enacted in the Decree of Head of Bapepam No. Kep-04/PM/2000 dated March
13, 2000 on the Takeover of Publicly-listed companies [hereinafter Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 2000], and then
amended and replaced by the Decree of Head of Bapepam No. Kep-05/PM/2002 dated April 3, 2002 on the Takeover of
Publicly-listed companies [hereinafter Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 2002]. A significant change was made by Bapepam-LK, by virtue of the Decree of Head of Bapepam-LK No. Kep-259/BL/2008 dated June 20, 2008 on the Takeover of
Publicly-listed companies [hereinafter Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 2008]. Various new instruments were introduced
in this Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 2008, the most important of which was the mandatory selling requirement.
10
Bapepam Regulation IX.F.1 was first contemplated under Decree of Head of Bapepam No. Kep-10/PM/2000 on Tender
Offer dated March 13, 2000 [hereinafter Bapepam Regulation No. IX.F.1 (2000)] and further amended by Decree of Head
of Bapepam No. Kep-04/PM/2002 on Tender Offer dated April 3, 2002 [hereinafter Bapepam Regulation No. IX.F.1
(2002)].
11
Bapepam-LK updated these two regulations by issuing: (i) the Decree of Head of Bapepam No. 264/BL/2011 dated 31
May 2011 on the Takeover of Publicly-listed companies [hereinafter Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 2011] amending
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 2008; and (ii) the Decree of Head of Bapepam No. 263/BL/2011 dated 31 May 2011
concerning Voluntary Tender Offer [hereinafter Bapepam Regulation No. IX.F.1 2011] amending the Rule IX.F.1 2002.
7

75
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2014

3

The Indonesian Capital Market Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 [2014], Art. 2
INDONESIAN CAPITAL MARKET REVIEW • VOL.VI • NO.2

Rule IX.F.1 2011), although both regulations
share similar principles.
Each version of Regulation No. IX.H.1 sets
forth a similar definition of a takeover: Takeover means “an activity, either directly or indirectly, that causes any change in a company’s
control.”12 Under this definition, the three essential elements of a takeover are: (1) there is an
activity (or action); (2) the activity (or action)
can be exercised either directly or indirectly;
and (3) the activity (or action) causes a change
in company control. The broad definition of an
“activity” can cover any activity, including a
voluntary public bid. While mandatory bid is
an obligatory consequence of a takeover, the
condition is different in the case of a voluntary
bid. Theoretically, a voluntary bid may lead to
takeover, only if there is a change of corporate
control. However, since there is no precedent
for a voluntary bid causing a change of control
of a company in Indonesia (takeover), the term
“activity” has, in practice, meant a takeover resulting from share acquisitions.
In the above definition, the concept of “control” is a key factor in determining whether a
takeover has occurred in Indonesia. Bapepam
Regulation No. IX.H.1 (2002) defines “company controller” as any person who:
1) owns 25% of a Company’s shares or
more, unless that person could prove
that he does not control the company, or
2) any person that directly or indirectly
has the ability to control a Company in
a manner of: a) determining the designation and resignation of directors and commissioners; or b) making any changes in
the Company’s Articles of Association.13
This amended the previous Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1. (2000) where the threshold
for being in control of a company was 20%
ownership. Meanwhile, Bapepam Regulation
No. IX.H.1 of 2008 and 2011 both define “com-

pany controller” as “any person who owns 50%
of a company’s paid-up shares or more, or any
person who directly or indirectly has the ability
to determine in any way whatsoever the management and/or policy of the publicly-listed
company.”14
Based on the above, determining whether
a shareholder is a company controller can be
done through the formal shareholding composition, the quantitative approach, or the actual control of the company, the qualitative approach. First, if using the formal shareholding
composition (quantitative) approach, it must be
determined if there have been increases from
20%-25% then to 50% in the ownership threshold. The increase of this threshold is intended
to enhance market liquidity and provide wider
access for investors acquiring shares in the Indonesian stock market.15 The takeover regulation imposes requirements on any potential
acquirer for disclosures, regulatory approvals,
and mandatory tender offers, etc. that might be
burdensome for companies if their corporate
actions constitute a takeover. Therefore, from a
potential acquirer’s perspective, the threshold’s
increase allows more corporate takeover activity. The 2002 Regulation, however, had a caveat
for the twenty-five percent threshold; namely,
that the act constitutes a takeover, “unless the
person could prove that he does not control
the company.”16 Under this Regulation, the acquirer has the burden of proving that the shares
to be acquired will not result in company control. This caveat was deleted after the threshold
was increased to fifty percent or more under the
2008 and 2011 Regulations.
Second, the qualitative approach, unlike the
quantitative approach, determines who has de
facto control of the company without regard to
the formal shareholding composition. The 2002
Regulation’s definition of control encompasses
“any person that directly or indirectly has the
ability to control a company in the manner of:

See Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(e) (2002) (Indon.), Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(e) (2008) (Indon.), and Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(c) (2011) (Indon).
13
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(d) (2002) (Indon.).
14
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(c) (2011) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(d) (2008) (Indon.).
15
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 consideration (a) (2008) (Indon.).
16
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(d) (2002) (Indon.) (emphasis added).
12
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(a) determining the designation and resignation of members of the board of directors and
commissioners; or (b) making any changes in
the Company’s Article of Association.”17 However, the 2008 and 2011 Regulations broaden
the definition by adding the provision that “any
person that directly or indirectly has the ability
to determine in any way whatsoever the management and/or policy of the publicly-listed
company” is considered a company controller.18
The discussion of qualitative control relates to
the fact that a takeover can be a direct or indirect activity. By introducing the concept of
“indirect control,” all Regulations (2002, 2008,
and 2011) have attempted to cover parties who
are not necessarily registered as the company’s
shareholder but can still exercise control over
the company. For example, the indirect control
provisions may apply to an “ultimate controller” a person who may not own shares, but can
control, determine, and greatly influence the
company’s decisions, although the Regulations
do not explicitly reference this concept.19
The 2000, 2002, 2008, and 2011 versions of
Regulation IX.H.1 provide different definitions
of a “person” who may be a controlling person
that consequently is compelled to make a mandatory offer. A person can be “a natural person,
a company, a legal entity, a partnership, an association, or any Organized Group.”20 “Natural
person” refers to an individual. Meanwhile, a
company can be in any legally recognized profit-seeking form, including that of a limited liability company, and it can either be a local or
foreign entity.
Mandatory tender offer

required to conduct a mandatory tender offer.
Under Bapepam Regulation No. IX.F.1 (2002),
“Tender Offer means an offer through the mass
media to acquire equity securities by purchase
or exchange with other Securities.”21 Pursuant
to the most recent amendments in Bapepam
Regulation Rule No. IX.H.1 (2011), a mandatory tender offer no longer refers to Bapepam
Regulation Rule No. IX.F.1 (2011), which
pertains exclusively to voluntary tender offers
(discussed further below). As contemplated in
the 2000, 2002, 2008, and 2011 versions of Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1, in the event of
a company takeover, the new controller of the
company must conduct a mandatory tender offer for all remaining shares of the company. The
shares that must be purchased by the new controller are the shares owned by the shareholders
prior to the announcement date of the proposed
tender. However, this requirement comes with
several exceptions. Under Bapepam Regulation
No. IX.H.1 (2011), the following shares are exempted from the mandatory tender offer:
a. shares owned by shareholders who have
made a Takeover transaction with the new
controller;
b. shares owned by other Parties who have obtained an offer with the same terms and conditions from the new controller;
c. shares owned by other Parties who at the
same time also conduct a Mandatory Tender Offer or Voluntary Tender Offer for the
shares in the same publicly listed company;
d. shares owned by the ultimate shareholder;
and
e. shares owned by the other controller of the
publicly-listed company.22

When a transaction is considered to be a
takeover, the party taking over the company is

The mandatory tender offer requirement
does not apply to a takeover as a result of cer-

Id.
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(c) (2011) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(d) (2008) (Indon.).
19
For discussion concerning beneficial/ultimate ownership across jurisdictions, including Indonesia, Erik P.M. Vermeulen,
“Beneficial Ownership and Control: A Comparative Study, Disclosure, Information and Enforcement”, OECD (March
2012), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/38/50068886.pdf (citing OECD-Indonesia policy dialogue on disclosure
of beneficial ownership and control, Bali on 5 Oct. 2011, in which the author quoted S. Claessen, S. Djankov and L.H.P.
Lang, “The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations”, 58 J. of Fin. Econ. 81 (2000)).
20
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(b) (2008) (Indon.).
21
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.F.1 art. 1(d) (2002) (Indon.).
22
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 (3)(a)(2) (2011) (Indon.). These provisions have also been incorporated in the previ17
18

77
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2014

5

The Indonesian Capital Market Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 [2014], Art. 2
INDONESIAN CAPITAL MARKET REVIEW • VOL.VI • NO.2

tain legal actions. Bapepam Regulation No.
IX.H.1 2008 and 2011 versions provide that the
following actions do not trigger the mandatory
tender offer requirement:
1. The takeover occurs due to marriage or
inheritance;
2. The takeover is performed by a party who
previously has no share in the publiclylisted company and the takeover occurs due
to the purchase or takeover of the shares in
the publicly-listed company within every 12
month period, in a maximum amount of 10%
of total outstanding shares with valid voting
rights;
3. The takeover occurs due to the performance
of duties and authority of a government or
state body or institution based on the laws;
4. The takeover occurs due to the direct purchase
of the shares owned and/or controlled by a
government or state body or institution as the
implementation of the provision as intended
in point 3);
5. The takeover occurs due to a court stipulation
or decision having permanent legal force;
6. The takeover occurs due to a merger, spin-off,
consolidation, or liquidation of a shareholder;
7. The takeover occurs due to a grant constituting
a transfer or shares without any agreement to
obtain compensation in any form whatsoever;
8. The takeover occurs due to the existence
of a certain debt guarantee stipulated in a
loan agreement, and a debt guarantee in the
context of the restructuring of the publiclylisted company stipulated by a government
or a state body or institution based on the
laws;
9. The takeover occurs due to share Takeover
as the implementation of Regulation Number
IX.D.1 and Regulation Number IX.D.4;23

10. The takeover occurs due to the
implementation of the policies of a
government or state body or institution;
11. The Mandatory Tender Offer, if
implemented, will be contradictory to laws
and regulation; and
12. The Takeover occurs due to the
implementation of a Voluntary Tender Offer
based on Regulation Number IX.F.1.24
Price formulation is another main issue in
the Indonesian regulations on mandatory offers. The price of a mandatory offer is essential in takeover regulations because the public
must receive the same price which the acquirer
offered to the controlling shareholder. In principle, there is a general shift from determining the offer price by the “highest price” to the
“average highest price” approach. At first, Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 (2000) did not distinguish between the prices for direct and indirect takeovers.25 However, the general rule is
that the price is determined by the highest share
price within a certain period.26 Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 (2002), which has adopted the
same approach, improved this rule by providing
requirements differentiating between direct and
indirect takeovers for determining the price of
the tender offer.27
“Direct takeover” refers to the change of
control over the publicly-listed company,
whereas “indirect takeover” means change of
control over the controller of the publicly listed
company, eventually leading up to the change
of control over such publicly listed company.
Despite the distinction, both direct and indirect
takeover will cause a mandatory tender offer,
the price of which is set pursuant to the highest
price within the last 90 days prior to the date of

ous Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 (2002) and Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 (2008) (Indon.). See also Bapepam
Regulation No. IX.F.1 art. 1(c) (2011) (describing “Substantial Shareholder” as any Person that directly or indirectly owns
at least 20% of the voting rights of a company’s issued shares).
23
Bapepam Regulation No.IX.D.1 governs pre-emptive rights, while Bapepam Regulation No.IX.D.4 governs capital
increases without pre-emptive rights.
24
Bapepam Regulation No. X.H.1 art. 15 (2008) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 art. 6(a) (2011) (Indon.).
25
See generally Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 (2000) (showing that no distinction is made that differentiates by price regardless of whether there is a direct versus indirect takeover).
26
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 7 (2000) (Indon.).
27
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 8 (2002) (Indon.).
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the announcement of the deal.
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 (2008) and
(2011) significantly amended the previous regulations by adopting the average highest price
rule.28 The 2011 Regulation states that the price
is the higher between (a) the average of the
highest daily trading prices on the IDX within
the ninety-day period before the announcement
of the tender offer or the negotiation and (b) the
takeover price. 29 For example, if the average
highly trading price on the IDX was IDR1,000
and the takeover price was set at IDR900, then
the price for the mandatory takeover would be
IDR1,000. This amends the 2002 Regulation, in
which the price was the higher between (a) the
highest trading price on IDX within the ninetyday period before the negotiation announcement and (b) the takeover price.30 In 2011,
Bapepam synchronized the rule concerning
voluntary tender offers by adopting the average
highest price approach. Therefore, the rules for
mandatory and voluntary public bids use the
average highest price of the traded stocks.31
There are at least two significant changes in
the new rules. First, the announcement date under the 2008 Regulation can be made either at
the commencement of the negotiation that may
result in a takeover or at the completion of the
takeover deal. This affects the price of the tender offer and, therefore, acquirers must decide
strategically when to announce the deal, and
contemplate how it may affect the tender offer
price. Second, the 2008 Regulation adopts the
“average highest price” standard instead of the

“highest price” standard. This approach reduces
the price for a tender offer, which arguably can
encourage a more active takeover market since
potential acquirers prefer lower prices. In addition, the highest price standard can reduce the
chance of market manipulation to create an artificially high price for tender offers by leaking
inside information. While information leakage
is difficult to monitor in Indonesia, the tender
offer price is determined by the average highest
price and, therefore, averaging the highest price
can disperse the impact of leaked information.

Result and Discussion
The conceptual problem of policy objectives
of the takeover rules
The policy objectives of the Indonesian
takeover rules have been continuously revised
over the years. As the Indonesian Stock Exchange continues to develop into an important
financial center in Asia, issues such as good
corporate governance, market liquidity, and investor protection become important policy objectives.32 The starting point for the discussion
is the theory of “the market for corporate control” as described in Henry Manne’s seminal
article, arguing that stock price, in part, reflects
the company’s management performance.33 The
market works by attaching less value to poorly
managed companies, thus enabling prospective parties to take over at discounted prices.34
Through the market for corporate control, as

See Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 art. 12 (2008), which is further adopted in Bapepam Rule IX.H.1 art. 4(c) (2011)
(Indon.).
29
Bapepam Rule IX.H.1 art. 4(c) (2011) (Indon.).
30
Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 art. 8 (2002) (Indon.).
31
Bapepam Regulation IX.F.1 art. 4(a)–(b) (2011) (Indon.) (setting the average price of the voluntary tender offer as the
higher between the offeror’s last bid, the average highest price at the stock changes ninety days prior to the announcement, the average highest price within twelve months prior to the last trading day of such shares, or a reasonable price
determined by an appraiser).
32
See also for the development of the Indonesian capital market, Yozua Makes, “Challenges and Opportunities for the
Indonesian Securities Takeover Regulations: A Comparative Legal Analysis”, U. of Penn East Asia Law Rev, Vol. 8 (2)
(2013): 82.
33
See Manne, Henry G. “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control.” Journal of Political Economy 73 (1965): 110.
34
Manne, Id. He argues that, ““A fundamental premise underlying the market for corporate control is the existence of
a high positive correlation between corporate managerial efficiency and the market price of shares of that company. As
an existing company is poorly managed – in the sense of not making as great a return for the shareholders as could be
accomplished under other feasible managements – the market price of the shares declines relative to the shares of other
companies in the same industry or relative to the market as a whole.” Further, “the lower the stock price, relative to what
28
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facilitated by the capital market, if the management of a company fails to do its job efficiently,
the company is subject to takeover from a more
efficient team, thus a new controller. Therefore,
a takeover, and the rules associated with it, is
aimed to induce better corporate governance
and thus increase the company’s value, suggesting the disciplinary effect of a takeover on the
company’s management. On the other hand, facilitating the market for corporate control is not
the sole objective of takeover rules. Based on
a comprehensive study conducted by Goergen,
Martynova, and Rennebog involving 30 European countries and more than 150 legal experts,
it is argued that takeover rules must also aim at
protecting the investor and developing the capital market.35 With regard to investor protection,
takeover rules must uphold basic corporate governance principles in order to mitigate conflicts
of interests between diverse company constituencies such as management, shareholders, and
stakeholders.36 Another objective, which was
not fully elaborated, is its importance in ensuring better development of an active capital market in a country. These three objectives are best
explained by the authors when they discussed
the conflicting objectives of the takeover law,
that require trade-offs, as follows:37
“First, in countries with dispersed ownership, provisions aiming at providing an
exit opportunity for target shareholders
are likely to discourage the monitoring
of managers via the market for corporate
control and vice versa.. A second trade-off

arises with respect to the two main functions of takeover regulation: the promotion of efficient corporate restructuring,
and the reduction of agency conflicts and
the protection of minority shareholders…
This constitutes a third trade-off of the
regulation: promoting the expansion of financial markets, and supplying corporate
governance devices aimed at protecting
the rights of corporate constituencies.”38
These differences in the three policy objectives (efficient corporate control, investor protection, and established capital market) affect
the structure and design of the takeover rules
adopted by a country. Drawing upon the theory of “efficient sales of corporate control”,39
arguably there is tension between the “market
rule” that promotes efficient transaction, and
the “equal opportunity rule” that encourages
more protection of the existing shareholders,
especially minority shareholders. The theory
argues that neither of the models dominates the
other by performing better in all cases because
there are many factors associated with the inefficiency costs of a takeover transaction. 40 If
the policy is aimed to promote efficient corporate control, then the law must ease the requirements for takeover, for example the absence of
the mandatory bid rule. However, if the rule
installs stricter controls, including the mandatory bid rule and tighter disclosure obligation,
one may expect better investor protection at the
expense of less M&A deals.
These are the policy choices that the regula-

it could be with more efficient management, the more attractive the takeover becomes to those who believe that they can
manage the company more efficiently.”
35
Mark Goergen, Marina Martynova, and Luc Rennebog, “Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence from Takeover
Regulation Reforms”, ECGI Law Working Paper Series, 33/2005, at p.2.
36
Id., at p. 6.
37
For example, see To quote a few, see generally Katharina Pistor et al., “Law and Finance in Transition Economies,”
8 Econ. of Transition 325 (2000); Bernard S. Black et al., “Final Report and Legal Reform Recommendations to the
Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea”, 26 Journal of Corporate Law 546 (2001); Bernard S. Black, “The Legal
and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets”, 48 UCLA Law Review, 781 (2001); Cally Jordan, “The
Conundrum of Corporate Governance”, 30 Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 983 (2005); William W. Bratton &
Joseph A. McCahery, “Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: the Case Against Global Cross
Reference”, 38 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. 213 (1999).
38
Id., at p. 8.
39
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, “Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
109, No. 4 (Nov., 1994), at p. 957-993.
40
Id.
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tor must cope with, which idea can be traced
back to the basic conceptual tension of efficiency vs. fairness in the legal system. The policy objective of the Indonesian capital market
law, as mentioned in Law 8/1995, is to create
an orderly, fair, and efficient capital market for
the interest of the shareholders and the society
at large.41 However, ascribing importance to
any notion of fairness may sometimes lead to
a conflict with the objective of promoting allocative efficiency, as discussed by Kaplow
and Shavell.42 This philosophical debate on
fairness-efficiency is then reflected in the debate about the structure of securities laws and
corporate governance system. For example, a
transaction might be value-enhancing and efficient in the economic sense, but not fair if
the personal interests of the parties are taken
into consideration. In this concern, fairness
concerns urge an affirmative protection to the
least-empowered parties, namely the protection
of the public shareholders.43Another relevant
issue in the context of takeover is the importance of protecting other stakeholders, including promoting financial stability, in a decision
to change the control of the company. This relates to the question as to whether the corporate
governance system of a company needs to be
concerned only about the interests of its shareholders or also to cover other policy agenda.
Pursuant to this paradigm, various countries
have conducted takeover regulatory reforms, as
assessed by Goergen, Martynova, Rennebog,
(2005) The basic idea of takeover regulatory
reforms is to resolve the conflict of interests between management and shareholders, with the
aim of improving investor protection.44 While
each reform has different policy objectives, all

are aimed either to “improve the efficiency of
the external monitoring by the market for corporate control, or restrict managerial decision
power with respect to the use of anti-takeover
devices.”45 Both objectives compel the management to pursue the interests of the shareholders,
and therefore shareholder protection remains
the primary interests of such reforms. This is
line with the study of La Porta et al, (1999)
arguing that better protection increases shareholders’ confidence and hence their willingness
to invest.46 In line with this approach, regulatory reforms must also provide better exit opportunities for minority shareholders, so that the
controlling shareholder can reduce its private
benefit of control that can endanger the minority shareholders.47
Amidst this tension regarding policy objective, the study argues that the Indonesian regulator has made it clear that takeover rules are
also designed to further expand its capital market, making it more liquid by attracting new investors to commit more deals, and at the same
time protecting their rights as shareholders.
Since 2008, Bapepam-LK’s policy objectives
with regard to takeover rule have been to increase the liquidity of listed stocks and to provide more access to investors to the Indonesian
stock exchange.48 Although the takeover rule is
further revised in 2011 in order to ensure better
legal certainty in relation to the mandatory sell
down obligation, such policy objectives are still
upheld.49 In this regard, the ‘sell-down rule’ requires that an offeror that conducts a MTO and
receives more than 80% of shares in a publicly
held company, must then within a certain time,
release back the shares acquired from the public in excess of said 80% so that those excess

See Article 4 of Law 8/1995 (Indon.) on the vision statement of fair, orderly, and efficient capital market. The elucidation of the Law also states that capital market is established to promote economic growth, equal distribution, and welfare.
42
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, ”Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice,” Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 411 (March 2003), Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=391060 p. 1.
43
See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004).
44
Goergen, Martynova, Rennebog, p. 6.
45
Goergen, Martynova, Rennebog, p. 8-9.
46
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, “Ownership around the world”, Journal of Finance 54
(1999), 471-517.
47
Goergen, Martynova, Rennebog, p. 8-9.
48
See consideration clause, Bapepam-LK Rule IX.H.1 (2008).
49
See consideration clause, Bapepam-LK Rule IX.H.1 (2011).
41
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shares can be held back by the public.50 The
purpose of this regulation is for market liquidity and to avoid publicly listed companies from
going private. This means that a publicly listed
company must have publicly traded shares of at
least 20% in the stock exchange.
There is also dynamism in the Indonesian
securities laws, as exemplified by the evolution
in the Bapepam-LK regulations that facilitate
more opportunities for shifting corporate control. This dynamism is seen, for example, from
the historical increase of threshold for ‘change
of control’ that triggers mandatory bid/MTO,
from 20% in 2000, to 25% in 2002, and currently, it has been set at 50% since 2008.51 Further,
the change of price formula from the ‘highest
price’ formula to ‘average highest price’ formula has also made takeover transactions practically cheaper than when it was under the previous MTO Price Formula. Previously, the price
of shares offered under the MTO was set at the
highest price of such shares within a certain
time period, according to which rule the price
was very prone to market fluctuations and inside dealing to increase the MTO price. However, the prevailing rule sets the MTO share
price at the average highest price of such share
within a certain time period (90 days), in order
to get price that reflects the market price properly. Arguably, these developments would facilitate more takeover transactions with decidedly
less cost.52 Putting more ease into the process is
the fact that the Bapepam-LK regulations also
do not require the conduct of a General Meeting
of Shareholders in the target company to facilitate takeover transactions.53
In short, the policy objectives of the Indonesian securities laws are to integrate all of the
three recognized takeover rule objectives: efficient change of corporate control, better inves-

tor protection, and a developed (liquid) capital market. However, as further shown below,
these objectives may conflict with each other in
practice. The mandatory bid rule is often avoided through creative compliance strategies based
on the virtue of the disclosure principle.
The cost of mandatory bid and its creative
strategies of compliance
From the point of view of prospective acquirers, the mandatory bid/MTO requirement may
be considered costly because it compels them
to offer all of the remaining shares which they
might not originally intend to acquire at a certain minimum price formula. On the other hand,
the mandatory bid requirement may prevent inefficient extraction of private benefits of control by the controlling shareholder.54 In short,
mandatory bid/MTO might restrict the number
of takeover transactions, which may designate
corporate control to a more efficient controller.
On the other hand, mandatory bid/MTO is set in
order to provide public/public shareholders the
same legal and economic rights that the existing
controller enjoys when it receives the takeover
offer, especially with regard to the share price.
The conflict between the protection of public
shareholders and facilitating market for corporate control is at the central discussion of the
mandatory bid/MTO requirement.
Prospective acquirers are still on the lookout for cheaper alternative strategies to take
over a company, without having to comply with
the mandatory bid requirements. The attendant
legal issues of these strategies have never been
properly assessed. While they are, for all intents
and purposes, administratively compliant, their
effect on the protection of public shareholders
is questionable. Grant, Kirchmaier, and Kirsh-

See Art. 3 Bapepam-LK Rule IX.H.1. (2008) (Indon.), and Art. 5 Bapepam-LK Rule IX.H.1. (2011) (Indon.).
See Art. 1 point (d), Bapepam-LK Rule IX.H.1 (2000) (Indon.), Art. 1 point (d), Bapepam-LK Rule IX.H.1 (2002) (Indon.), Art. 1 point (d), Bapepam-LK Rule IX.H.1 (2008) (Indon.), and Art. 1 point (c), Bapepam-LK Rule IX.H.1 (2011)
(Indon.).
52
See Art. 7 Bapepam-LK Rule IX.H.1 (2000 (Indon.)), Art. 8, Bapepam-LK Rule IX.H.1 (2002) (Indon.), Art. 12,
Bapepam-LK Rule IX.H.1 (2008) (Indon.), and Art. 4 point (c), Bapepam-LK Rule IX.H.1 (2011) (Indon.).
53
See Art. 3 point (b), Bapepam-LK Rule IX.H.1 (2011) (Indon.).
54
For the discussion regarding the efficiency of the mandatory bid rule, based on the “equal opportunity” principle, see
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, “Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics (November 1994).
50
51
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ner describe a similar phenomena occurring in
Germany and Italy as creative compliance of
the mandatory bid rule often employed by the
dominant shareholder.55 This section will provide a brief discussion of these creative strategies being practiced today.
Creative strategy for not complying with the
mandatory bid rule is often associated with “financial tunneling”, referred to as “self-dealing
by dominant shareholders and discriminatory
financial transactions, such as dilutive share issues, minority freeze-outs, insider trading, and
creeping acquisitions”.56 Atasanov et al coin
the term ‘equity tunneling’ to also include saleof-control at preferential terms for controlling
shareholders.57 Grant, Kirchmaier, and Kirshner argue that avoidance of the mandatory bid
rule –“enabling bidders to take control of companies at lower costs or to pay higher prices
for controlling stakes, giving them unfair competitive advantages in the acquisition process”,
constitutes financial tunneling.58 Indeed, there
are a number of issues left unanswered in order
to make sure that takeover deals can be carried
out efficiently and fairly based on the principle
of legal certainty. The requirements under Indonesian law to conduct an MTO, (known in
other jurisdictions as a mandatory bid rule), as
mentioned, is a factor that the acquirer wishes
to avoid in a takeover. In general parties wish
to avoid this mandatory bid/MTO requirement
through the use of certain legal strategies to
structure the transaction. The requirement also
creates a significant cost for companies wishing
only to acquire a part, not all, of the publiclylisted companies’ shares in order to gain control
in a publicly-listed company
In this regard, the article argues that mandatory bid avoidance is value decreasing only to
the extent that it reduces the rights of the public shareholders over the company. When such
rights are already facilitated through advanced

mandatory disclosure, the public shareholders
are empowered and can make informed decisions regarding the company. The rights of public shareholders are not impaired if there is a
proper disclosure mechanism in place in line
with the takeover, so that the public shareholders can freely decide to exit, or to participate
in the transaction. In defense of this argument,
the research discusses strategies that are often
employed by acquirer, namely: (1) VTO bid;
(2) rights issue with change of control; and (3)
strategic listing. In general, these three creative
strategies, discussed below, are employed to
avoid the MTO requirements for a takeover.
In a VTO bid, the offeror places a public
bid for shares of a publicly-listed company, although it can also purchase the shares by negotiating directly with the controlling shareholder.
The prospective acquirer can enter into a private
agreement with the controlling shareholder that
the controlling shareholder will sell its shares
once the public bid is placed. VTO bid is a form
of voluntary bid, in which the offeror can bid the
shares of a publicly-listed company pursuant to
the terms and conditions that offeror can freely
invoke. Subsequent to the VTO bid, there is no
obligation to carry out any MTO bid. This is
in contrast to acquisition transaction that leads
to change of control, which in turn triggers the
obligation for MTO. This method avoids the
requirements for an MTO/mandatory bid since
by regulation once an acquirer controls (read:
obtains) the controlling stake through VTO it
would not be forced to further conduct MTO.
Another method to control a publicly listed
company without complying with MTO requirements is by way of conducting a rights issue with change of control. In this structure, a
company plans to increase its capital by issuing
more shares to the public, commonly from the
unissued authorized stock. At the same time,
there will also be a stand-by purchaser, being

Jeremy Grant, Tom Kirchmaier, and Jodie Kirshner, “Financial Tunneling and Mandatory Bid Rule”, 10 European Business Organization Law Review 2 (June 2009), p. 233-253.
56
Johnson, Simon, La Porta, Rafael, Lopez de Silanes, Florencio and Shleifer, Andrei, Tunnelling (January 2000). Harvard Institute of Economic Research Paper No. 1887.
57
Atanasov, V. A., B. S. Black, et al. (2008). "Unbundling and Measuring Tunneling." U of Texas Law, Law and Econ
Research Paper(117).
58
Grant, Kirchmaier, and Kirshner, Id., at p. 3.
55
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one or more existing shareholders, that will
subscribe to shares that are not subscribed to
by the other existing shareholders. Once this
stand-by buyer subscribes to the issued shares,
the shareholdings of the existing, non-participatory, shareholders (including the public shareholders) are diluted for their non-participation
in the rights issue. This results in a change of
control of the company, with the standby buyer
becoming the new majority shareholder, and
therefore acting as the new controlling shareholder. In this respect, the acquirer will act as
a stand-by purchaser to obtain its contemplated
controlling shareholding in that company. Bapepam-LK IX.H.1 states that change of control
resulting from rights issue is exempted from
the mandatory bid obligation. In practice, issuers have managed to convince that this structure
is exempted from mandatory bid obligation because the fund that is raised in the transaction
goes into the company, as opposed to standard
takeover in which the proceed of sales is for
the benefit of the seller. Also the existing shareholders have been given the opportunity to subscribe to the newly issued shares in accordance
with the respective shareholding composition
of the company.
Strategic listing is also employed by acquirers to avoid the MTO requirement. In principle,
the acquisition of publicly-listed company incurs a lower tax compared to the acquisition of
a private company due to the special treatment
under the tax regulation on transfer of publicly
listed shares through the exchange. This leads
to the method of ‘strategic listing’, in which the
acquisition deal is made before IPO, but then
the execution of the takeover (read: the actual share transfer) is carried out after the IPO.
There are conflicting views as to whether this
type of transaction must be followed by a MTO.
On this matter, there were practices in certain
transactions whereby Bapepam-LK posits that
such post IPO acquisition is not subject to
MTO because the proposed takeover transaction has already been disclosed in the IPO prospectus provided to the investors. This means

that, through the prospectus, the investors will
have an opportunity to consider the profiles of
the pre- and post- controlling shareholder in the
publicly listed company.

Conclusion
In summary, despite the high cost of MTO
obligation pursuant to the prevailing securities
rules, in practice there are strategies to creatively comply with the formalistic and procedural requirements as set out by the regulator
(Bapepam-LK, now OJK), with respect to mandatory bid/MTO requirements. The benchmark
to assess the efficacy of such action is whether
the transaction causes detriment to the minority shareholders, for they are not able to receive
the same treatment that the controlling shareholders enjoy with their control premium. The
Indonesian regulator, Bapepam-LK, adopts a
pragmatic approach to creative structures that
might adversely affect public shareholders.
That being said, the benchmark to determine
whether a creative strategy reduces the right of
the public shareholders is the extent to which
the mandatory disclosure is considered sufficient to protect the minority shareholders. The
importance of the disclosure principle in takeover transactions with creative structures must
be further emphasized with due regard to other
possible legal mechanisms to protect the interest of the public shareholders, including to give
them a well-informed decision as to their participation in the MTO.
A logical follow-up question then would be:
whether disclosure is enough to justify the creative compliance strategy, and to which extent
such disclosure is considered enough. Reinier
Kraakman once argued disclosure can facilitate enforcement insofar as it “discourages opportunism in its own right” and “permits other
legal controls that deter self-dealing decisions
by corporate insiders.”59 This is in line with
the corporate governance role of the disclosure principle in the capital market that it can
play an active role in reducing the costs asso-

Reinier Kraakman, “Disclosure and Corporate Governance: An Overview Essay”, in Guido Ferrarini, Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe, (2004), at p. 96.
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ciated with corporate governance problem.60
One study finds that high disclosure standards
are strongly associated with lower levels of private benefits.61 In another study, La Porta et al
(1999)find that as disclosure improves, the size
of the block premium decreases.62 Consequently when a new party holding a substantial portion of shares does not attempt to use its power
to control the management of the company (a
passive portfolio investor).
Finally, one important point to consider is
the fact that particularly in the Indonesian context, the regulatory objective has been set to
provide more market liquidity, in an effort to
strengthen and stabilize the stock exchange as
a key pillar in the country’s economic growth.
The objective to promote more liquid and active market and the existence of the mandatory
bid rule is arguably contradictory. A liquid capital market is designed to provide flexibility for
potential investors to enter and exit any company listed in the Indonesian stock exchange.
This is especially evident with regard to the
existence of international/foreign investor that
aims to take over and actively take control over
Indonesian firms. In line with the “market for

corporate control” theory that suggests that active market induces better corporate governance and management, international/foreign
investors can promote better corporate governance of Indonesian firms. That said, mandatory
disclosure is a principle that can bring balance
between the need to have active and liquid capital market on one hand, and investor protection
on the other hand, so that more deals can be
concluded without undermining the rights of
the minority shareholders. Further, mandatory
disclosure lowers the cost of raising capital in
the market63 which is important to develop the
system of capital market in an emerging market
such as Indonesia. However, notwithstanding
the important role of the mandatory disclosure
rule, it does protect the public shareholders and
hence does not justify avoidance of the mandatory bid obligation. Mandatory disclosure and
mandatory bid, in practice, are inseparable. The
information provided in a mandatory disclosure
helps public shareholders make well-informed
decisions on whether or not they should participate in the MTO, although it does not provide
the rights to exit or sell at the premium price, as
guaranteed in a mandatory bid scheme.
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